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We know from everyday experience that when we need to keep a small amount of
verbal information “in mind” for a short period, an effective cognitive strategy is to
silently rehearse the words. This basic cognitive strategy has been elegantly codified
in Baddeley and colleagues model of verbal working memory, the phonological loop.
Here we explore how the intuitive appeal of the phonological loop is grounded in
the phenomenological experience of subvocal rehearsal as consisting of an interaction
between an “inner voice” and an “inner ear.” We focus particularly on how our intuitions
about the phenomenological experience of “inner speech” might constrain or otherwise
inform the functional architecture of information processing models of verbal working
memory such as the phonological loop; and how, indeed, how ideas about consciousness
may offer alternative explanations for the dual nature of inner speech in verbal working
memory.
Keywords: working memory, phonological loop, inner ear, inner voice, consciousness
THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PHONOLOGICAL
LOOP: HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT
Working memory is a cognitive system for the maintenance,
manipulation, and monitoring of information that is not cur-
rently available in the sensory environment. There is extensive
empirical evidence showing that working memory is capacity
limited: that one can only retain 3 or 4 independent items or
objects “in” working memory at a time (Cowan, 2001; Marois
and Ivanoff, 2005). But what does it mean for an item—an
internal mental representation—to be “in” working memory? A
functional or operational definition might say that for some-
thing to be in working memory, it must be readily accessible
and can be reported or otherwise described by a subject under
study. According to this definition, a way to find out what a per-
son currently holds in working memory is simply to ask them.
If we define working memory in this way, that is, as the current
contents of memory that are available for subjective report, then
we may say that working memory consists only of consciously
accessible information.
A key historical precursor to working memory, the Jamesian
concept of primary memory, was identified more or less directly
with the contents of consciousness. Many modern theorists also
see a close connection between working memory and conscious-
ness. For example, Cowan (1993) has proposed that while many
mental representations may be in an “activated state” at any given
time, only those representations that are within the capacity-
limited “focus of attention,” a concept closely related to conscious
awareness, are accessible within working memory. Baars (Baars
and Franklin, 2003) has argued that consciousness is associated
with a limited capacity “global workspace,” akin to working mem-
ory, whose focal contents are broadcast to widely distributed
specialized networks in the brain.
In the classic working memory model of Baddeley and col-
leagues (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1992, 2003; Repovs
and Baddeley, 2006), however, consciousness is not an explicit
motivating force for the logic and structure of the theory.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the model are often informally
identified with some characteristics of conscious experience. This
is especially clear in the case of the verbal component of work-
ing memory, the “phonological loop,” where the resemblance
between the model and subjective phenomena seems to be more
than merely metaphorical. Our present goal is to show that even
a seemingly consciousness-averse information-processing model
such as the phonological loop owes something to an introspec-
tive analysis of conscious experience. We focus particularly on
how our intuitions about the phenomenological experience of
“inner speech” might constrain or otherwise inform the func-
tional architecture of information processing models of verbal
workingmemory such as the phonological loop; and how, indeed,
the analysis of consciousness may suggest alternative interpreta-
tions of the fundamental nature of inner speech in verbal working
memory.
THE MULTI-COMPONENTWORKING MEMORYMODEL
The goal of the working memory model (Baddeley, 1992) is to
provide a basic functional description of how internal mental
representations are maintained online during complex cogni-
tive processing. It consists of two so-called “slave systems,” the
visuospatial scratchpad and the phonological loop, which are
dedicated to the storage of visual and verbal information, respec-
tively. The visuospatial scratchpad and the phonological loop
are conceived of as buffers, that is, as containers of highly pro-
cessed information and are not directly involved in the perceptual
analysis of sensory stimuli. Both of these storage subsystems are
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controlled and monitored by a superordinate cognitive control
mechanism called the “central executive.” While the visuospa-
tial scratchpad is described as a single storage component (but
see Logie; Logie and Pearson, 1997), the phonological loop con-
sists of two sub-components, a storage component called the
phonological store and a maintenance component known as the
articulatory rehearsal process. The phonological store can hold
speech-based information for a brief period of time (approxi-
mately 2 s per item) before it is lost to decay. The role of the
articulatory rehearsal process is to counteract this decay by peri-
odically “refreshing” the contents of the phonological store by way
of subvocal speech.
INNER SPEECH AS A MNEMONIC STRATEGY
Because of the importance of language and communication in
human cognition, memory for verbal information has been the
topic of a great deal of research in the cognitive sciences over the
last 50 years. A somewhat trivial (and by now nearly anachronis-
tic) but oft-cited example of the need in everyday life for verbal
working memory, is to keep the digits of a phone number “in
mind” after reading them from a phonebook or hearing them
from a telephone operator. There is a period of time in between
receiving the number and dialing it where the ordered sequence
of digits must be maintained in working memory; and during
this interval most people will “repeat the numbers to themselves,”
either overtly or covertly, as a way of keeping the digits conscious
and accessible. But what does this behavior, this routine cognitive
strategy, tell us about the kind and nature of the internal codes
that are used in verbal working memory?
One might ask of course whether subvocal rehearsal is actu-
ally beneficial to memory performance. This question has been
answered by testing subjects’ memory for lists of verbal items
while preventing rehearsal by requiring them to concurrently
articulate an irrelevant word (e.g., “hiya”) during a delay period
interposed between stimulus perception and recall. Many studies
have shown that blocking rehearsal through “articulatory sup-
pression” has a strong negative effect on recall performance,
suggesting that the cognitive strategy of rehearsal is indeed useful
(e.g., Baddeley et al., 1984). A second obvious question is whether
for rehearsal to be an effective strategy, the to-be-remembered
verbal items must be spoken aloud; if so, it would suggest that
rehearsal serves merely as a kind of trick to “re-present” the
items to the auditory perceptual system through external sensory
feedback loop. In fact, however, studies have shown that verbal
rehearsal is beneficial to memory even when it is subvocal and
thus produces no external auditory feedback (e.g., Murray, 1968).
Here we note that this finding also comports with phenomeno-
logical experience: when we “silently talk to ourselves”—when
we subvocally rehearse—we seem to hear a dim but unmistak-
able voice; we are listening to this voice, and we typically identify
this voice as our own. The empirical demonstration that subvocal
rehearsal is beneficial to short-term verbal recall, combined with
the subjective experience that internal speech involves both an
inner voice and an inner ear, offers intuitive support for the basic
architecture of the phonological loop model of verbal working
memory, which posits the existence of two such communicating
components.
SENSORY AND MOTOR CODES IN THE PHONOLOGICAL
LOOP
A fundamental aspect of the phonological loop model is that it
involves the repeated conversion between two codes: one that is
a (quasi-sensory) phonological code and one that is an (quasi-
motor) articulatory code (Wilson, 2001). Both of these codes
represent verbal content and the transfer from one format to
the other does not involve in a net gain or loss of informa-
tion in the system. Although we have noted that the dual coding
premise appeals to our subjective experience of the inner voice
and inner ear during covert speech, from an information pro-
cessing standpoint it seems rather like a pointless game of rep-
resentational ping-pong. Indeed, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) had
initially attempted to explain the main empirical findings of ver-
bal working memory research more parsimoniously in terms of
a single articulatory component, without the need for an audi-
tory/perceptual store. This was based on the strong evidence for
the critical role of speech production processes in verbal span
tasks. For instance, individual differences data showed that the
faster a person is able to articulate a set of words, the greater his
or her verbal memory span (Landauer, 1962). In addition, sets of
words that take longer to articulate result in poorer memory per-
formance than sets of shorter duration words (the word-length
effect Baddeley et al., 1975); and, as mentioned previously, block-
ing subvocal rehearsal through articulatory suppression impairs
verbal short-term memory.
Several lines of evidence, however, ultimately compelled the
addition of the phonological store component and with it the
dual coding view of verbal working memory was established
(Salame and Baddeley, 1982). First, neuropsychological investiga-
tions showed the existence of patients with dramatically reduced
auditory-verbal short-term memory in presence of preserved
speech production and auditory comprehension abilities (Shallice
and Warrington, 1977; Shallice and Vallar, 1990). Second, artic-
ulatory suppression eradicates the phonological similarity effect
when verbal stimulus presentation is visual, but not when it is
auditory. This finding suggested that the phonological similarity
effect was based on an auditory-perceptual code rather than an
articulatory one. Third, the ability to make rhyme judgments on a
pair of visually presented words is unaffected by articulatory sup-
pression (Baddeley and Lewis, 1981). Fourth, the presentation of
irrelevant speech during immediate verbal memory has a dele-
terious effect on serial recall (Jones and Morris, 1992; Beaman
and Jones, 1998), suggesting the existence of a representational
code more closely tied to the auditory-sensory system than to the
articulatory-motor system.
To account for these data, Baddeley and colleagues split the
articulatory loop into an articulatory control process and a
phonological store, which act in concert to retain verbal infor-
mation in working memory (Salame and Baddeley, 1982). In the
new model, neither component is on its own capable of support-
ing maintenance of verbal information in working memory, each
has as it were an Achilles heel. The articulatory rehearsal process
has no storage capacity of its own, but can refresh the contents of
the phonological store, which are otherwise subject to rapid time-
based decay. The phonological store has a memory capacity of its
own, but no internal means of reactivating its decaying contents.
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Thus, as neither component is self-sufficient, damage to either
one of these components should result in severe degradation in
the performance of the system. Indeed, the interdependence of
two such components is supported by neuropsychological data
showing that patients with severe dysarthria, and thus a dam-
aged articulatory control process, have greatly reduced verbal
working memory (Baddeley and Wilson, 1985); and, as already
mentioned, patients with temporo-parietal lesions have been
described with intact speech production and comprehension
abilities, but impaired auditory-verbal short-termmemory spans.
THE INNER EAR, THE INNER VOICE AND THE
PHONOLOGICAL LOOP
We have briefly reviewed the historical development of the
phonological loop and some of the empirical evidence that led
to the fractionation of the verbal component of working memory
into an articulatory and phonological component. It is interesting
to note that the evolution of the phonological loop converged on
an architecture that is more compatible with phenomenal experi-
ence than its purely articulatory precursor. It may be instructive to
consider whether this congruence between introspective evidence
and the structure of an information-processing model is more
than a coincidence, or whether it may have a deeper significance.
A seemingly arbitrary aspect of the phonological loop is the
claim that the articulatory control process has no internal stor-
age capacity. This might translate, in phenomenological terms,
to: “the inner voice cannot hear itself speak,” or: “the inner voice
is deaf.” If we, for the sake of argument, endow the articulatory
control process with storage capacity and the ability to reacti-
vate its own contents (i.e., as in original articulatory loop model),
then from an information processing standpoint the component
becomes self-sufficient and self-referential: it is a voice that can
hear itself speak.
Putting aside behavioral considerations for or against such an
architecture, it seems to run counter to the introspective evidence
telling us that inner speech is a private version of outer speech.
Thus, the auditory-perceptual quality of the auditory imagery of
the inner ear is like hearing external speech, just as when we imag-
ine a patch of green light it is (phenomenologically) like seeing
a patch of green light (Place, 1956; Smart, 1959; Shepard and
Chipman, 1970). Moreover, during inner speech, verbal informa-
tion constitutes the content of the auditory imagery of the inner
ear, and as such is consciously reportable. We cannot say the same
for the inner voice: although one can describe a feeling of agency
during inner speech (Morsella et al., 2011), this feeling does not
carry any linguistic content, and there are no other articulatory-
motoric sensations that can be described as representing a verbal
message. Thus, an introspective analysis of the phenomenology
of inner speech is in favor of the existence of two separable con-
scious components, and it is not difficult to identify a resemblance
between these two phenomena and the functional components of
the phonological loop.
THE NEED FOR AN OBSERVER OF MOTOR PROGRAMS
One might say that the inner voice is only identifiable as marker
of agency, conveying the feeling that: “it is you that is speaking;”
whereas the inner ear carries the conscious content of the
message: “this is what you are saying.” Indeed, the conscious
experience of inner actions, including speech production, lack
reportable content apart from indicators of agency such as
urges, plans, and intentions (Morsella et al., 2011). To enable
self-awareness of the content of motor speech programs, such
action representations must first be as it were rendered into
sensory-perceptual space. Thus, we may say that the content of
motor programs are not introspectable, they cannot be reflected
upon, without first being in some sense realized and observed.
This may simply be a necessary property of a self-conscious
organism: it cannot anticipate the content of its own actions
before these actions have been either explicitly executed or inter-
nally simulated (Libet et al., 1982). Another way to understand
the impenetrability of the content of motor programs is to
assume that neural computations and conscious representations
are necessarily independent of one another. In other words, a
computational process cannot observe itself: viz. the inner voice
cannot hear itself speak. We may further note that whereas the
computational goal of the action system is to encode motor
programs that determine an organism’s future interactions with
the environment, the primary role of the perceptual system is
to decode and represent the content of the sensory world. In
this sense, then, the auditory-perceptual system is well suited
to perform its regular role as the observer in the cortico-cortico
crosstalk that is the neural substrate of inner speech (Buchsbaum
et al., 2001; Buchsbaum and D’Esposito, 2008).
THE INNER EAR, THE INNER VOICE, AND THE BRAIN
We have noted a resemblance between subjective experience of
inner speech and the two-component structure of the phonolog-
ical loop. This resemblance may also be seen to extend in to the
brain, where even in the 19th century Carl Wernicke referred to
the generative process of speech production as consisting of the
simultaneous co-activation of “auditory word images,” housed in
the superior temporal gyrus, and “motor word images” stored
in the inferior frontal gyrus; and they were assumed to be con-
nected by a large fiber bundle spanning across the frontal and
temporal lobes called the arcuate fasciculus (Eggert andWernicke,
1874/1977).
Modern functional neuroimaging studies of inner speech in
the context of simple working memory tasks where subjects must
keep in mind a small set of words or pseudowords over a delay
period have essentially verifiedWernicke’s hypothesis. Many stud-
ies have shown that during subvocal rehearsal robust activation is
observed in both frontal “motor” regions (Broca’s area, premo-
tor cortex) and posterior “sensory” regions (planum temporale,
superior temporal sulcus) that are often implicated in speech per-
ception and production processes (Wise et al., 2001; Hickok et al.,
2003; Buchsbaum et al., 2001, 2005, 2011). Indeed, the continu-
ous co-activation of inferior frontal and superior temporal brain
sites during inner speech has recently been show to persist for as
long as 45 s in a task requiring extended inner speech (Fegen et al.,
submitted), long after transient executive and cognitive control
processes that are activated during stimulus encoding have ceased
and the subject has entered an automatic “maintenance mode.”
Thus,Wernicke’s notion of a simultaneous reverberation between
auditory andmotor word images, an idea that has an affinity with
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phenomenological experience of inner speech, finds support from
functional neuroimaging studies of subvocal rehearsal.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING INNER SPEECH AND
VERBAL WORKING MEMORY
In light of the above discussion, then, one might argue that the
“Achilles Heel” of the articulatory rehearsal process is not, as
is claimed in the phonological loop model, that it lacks stor-
age capacity, but rather that it lacks a direct means of delivering
information to conscious awareness. Articulatory programs must
be routed through the sensory perceptual system to gain access
to conscious awareness. Earlier we referred to this aspect of the
model as an unnecessary game of representational ping-pong.
It is traditionally explained by assuming that the articulatory
rehearsal process lacks storage capacity and therefore must con-
tinuously access and update representations in the phonological
store. However, there is no special reason to assume that the
articulatory system lacks storage capacity—in fact, there is rea-
son to think otherwise (e.g., Monsell, 1984; Levelt, 1993). Rather,
we propose that the two-component architecture of the phono-
logical loop may be better understood as a emerging from the
requirement that articulatory programs must first be witnessed
by a sensory system before they can gain access to consciousness
and working memory. If we take this view, then the concept of
a single locus for the temporary storage of phonological infor-
mation is no longer necessary to explain the inner voice/inner
ear duality of verbal working memory. Rather, we may dispense
with the notion of temporary storage altogether (e.g., Craik and
Kirsner, 1974; Ruchkin et al., 2003; Postle, 2006; Buchsbaum
and D’Esposito, 2008), and instead propose that the this duality
is a fundamental consequence of the conscious impenetrabil-
ity articulatory motor programs and the corresponding need
for a external representational system into which motor output
can be projected. In fact, coordinated activity between anterior
“motor” systems and posterior “sensory” systems appears to be
a general feature of declarative memory systems across multiple
sensory modalities and domains (Danker and Anderson, 2010;
Buchsbaum et al., 2012); and thus the literal conversation of
inner speech may only be a special case of a neurophysiologi-
cal principle that dictates that conscious thoughts emerge from
the coordinated interplay between anterior and posterior brain
systems.
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